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FOR THE SPEAKER, BUT AGAINST
THE FIRST AMENDMENT*
Kenneth J. Levitt
Although the Supreme Court takes cases sparingly, this past Term the
Court took five First Amendment cases. Remarkably, the result is that this
Court has muddied the water of First Amendment jurisprudence more than it
has clarified it. One needs graph paper to chart the different opinions, determine
where the Court's holdings are, and track which Justices concur and dissent. It
is a very fragmented Court, and in almost all of the cases, even those that are
nearly unanimous in result, there are several opinions with competing impulses.
To begin with, and to put these cases into context, it is important to sum-
mon the governing paradigm envisioned when one considers political speech
and the First Amendment. The vision that most have and, I submit, the vision
which still guides the Court, is that of the "soapbox speaker" standing on the
street comer and making his or her political views known in the face of govern-
ment efforts to censor or suppress that speech. That is the "tradition" out of
which these First Amendment cases arise. However, it is necessary to keep in
mind who petitioners are in these cases; a cable consortium,' a State Republi-
can Party,2 the liquor industry3 and independent contractors who have commer-
cial interests with the government.4 So, in the words of one renowned First
Amendment scholar, in many ways, we have moved from the arena of the soap-
box speaker to CBS.5 The advocates of free speech are now some of the more
powerful political actors in society, not figures at the fringes of American polit-
ical debate and culture.
Consistent with this First Amendment tradition, the Court usually views
the State as the enemy of the First Amendment-the foe of free speech, sinister
in its efforts to regulate expression. It is that tradition which has inhibited legis-
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1995 Supreme
Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, December 6, 1996.
t Crowe & Dunlevy, Tulsa, Oklahoma; B.A., Brown University; J.D., Yale University.
1. See Denver Area Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
2. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
3. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
4. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996); O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v.
City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct 2353 (1996).
5. See Owen M. Fiss, Essay, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405, 1410 (1986).
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lative efforts to regulate larger, more powerful interests in the name of free,
speech. The idea that the State and the State's efforts to regulate could be a
friend of the First Amendment and free speech is foreign to the Supreme Court.
While reformers advocate the use of law to promote speech and strengthen the
voice of the disenfranchised in order to promote a more inclusive and robust
democratic debate, their view has largely been rejected by this Court.
I. CHIPPING AWAY AT CAMPAIGN REFORM-UNLIMITED SPENDING
IN ThE NAME OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC,6 the Court
struck down the "Party Expenditure Provision" of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act,7 which imposed a dollar limit on expenditures made in connection
with the general election campaign of a congressional candidate. The Colorado
Republican case arose after the 1984 Colorado Senate elections in which Tim
Wirth was ultimately elected to the Senate.8 Before the nominations of either
party took place, the Republican Party of Colorado spent $15,000 on attack ads
against Tim Wirth.9 Under the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Republican
Party of Colorado could only spend $103,000 in any congressional election, an
amount based on an apportionment formula provided in the statute. The Repub-
lican Party of Colorado had assigned its allotted $103,000 to the national Re-
publican Party, so its account balance was zero. However, the state party spent
an additional $15,000 on the attack ads against Wirth." The Federal Election
Commission took the case to court, saying that the expenditure for the Repub-
lican Party of Colorado was a violation of the Act's limits on party expendi-
tures.
1
The district court read the statutory provision in the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act very narrowly and found that this expenditure really was not in con-
nection with a Congressional election because it was made before the candi-
dates had been nominated. 2 Therefore, the district court held that the spending
limit provision did not apply. 3 The Tenth Circuit reversed and held that the
expenditure was in connection with a congressional campaign, and that the
$15,000 expenditure was therefore over the limit. 4 On review, the Supreme
Court in a very fragmented holding held that the FECA provision was unconsti-
6. 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
7. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (1994).




12. See FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1455-56 (D. Colo.
1993).
13. See id. at 1457.
14. See FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1022 (10th Cir. 1995).
[Vol. 32:441
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AGAINST THE FIRST AMENDMENT
tutional as applied." Moreover, a large part of the Court went on to say that
the FECA provision at issue is unconstitutional on its face.6
In assessing the Colorado Republican case, it is crucial to step back and
review an earlier decision that sets the stage for this opinion. Buckley v.
Valeo is the nine-hundred pound gorilla of all campaign finance jurispru-
dence. The case arose in the wake of the Watergate scandal and the passage of
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. The Court dissected
much of that Act in the extensive Buckley opinion. The Court there distin-
guished contribution limits from expenditure limits, and held that Congressional
regulation of contributions to candidates is permissible and constitutional. 8
The Court concluded that contribution limits do not significantly limit free
speech rights, even if one wants to contribute more than the Congressionally
mandated limit to a candidate. 9 Because of Buckley, for instance, when one
contributes to a congressional candidate, one cannot contribute over $1,000 in
either a primary or general election campaign under current law.
On the other hand, in Buckley the Court struck down the other half of what
the Federal Election Campaign Act was all about--expenditure limitations.
There is no constitutional way, according to Buckley, to limit the overall expen-
ditures of a congressional candidate or political action committee. So, if a sena-
torial candidate wants to spend ten million dollars in Oklahoma, that candidate
can do it, and it is unconstitutional to limit such an expenditure. The rationale
for the distinction, according to the Court, was that the only constitutional justi-
fication for limiting contributions or expenditures would be to prohibit bribery.
In short, only quid pro quo corruption can be regulated? The Buckley Court
did not see much of a nexus between limiting expenditures and the legislative
objective of prohibiting bribery or quid pro quo corruption; therefore, any limit
on how much a candidate can spend in an election is unacceptable, even if that
limit is placed at a level that would enable extraordinary amounts to be expend-
ed.2'
If that distinction and rationale is confusing or unconvincing, it very well
should be. It has been assailed by commentators across the spectrum. It also
comes under strong attack in Colorado Republican by Justice Thomas in his
dissent.' Nonetheless, the decision by the Court in Colorado Republican ad-
heres to Buckley's contribution/expenditure distinction. Writing for the Court,
Justice Breyer noted that the $15,000 in radio ads spent by the Colorado Re-
publican Campaign Committee was not related to any specific candidate and
15. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2314 (1996).
16. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id at 2323 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. 424 U.S. I (1976).
18. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
19. See id. at 29.
20. See id. at 45.
21. See id. at 46-47.
22. See Colorado Republican, 116 S. Ct. at 2323 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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was therefore not comparable to a contribution?0 The disbursement was made
before the primaries and was not made in conjunction with any advertising
strategy by a specific candidate.24 The Republican Party, according to the
Court, acted alone. Monies spent were not coordinated and, thus, were unlike a
contribution. Instead, the Party's actions were considered more closely analo-
gous to an expenditure and expenditures, as the Court held in Buckley, cannot
be limited.'
This leaves open a question for Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer; had
there been coordination with the Republican nominee to attack Tim Wirth,
would that contribution be illegal under Buckley? Clearly, the majority would
be forced to find that such coordination would be illegal and in that context
would have upheld the constitutionality of the FECA provision. Justices Kenne-
dy, Scalia and Rehnquist go much further in their concurrence and hold that the
entire effort to restrict political spending by political parties is unconstitution-
al.' In their view, there is no corruption problem when political parties are
involved. If a party wants to go out and spend all its money at once in favor of
a candidate, that is not bribery-that is what political parties are supposed to
do. The parties should get their ideas and visions out to the public.' More-
over, parties and candidates are essentially interchangeable because they share
an identity of interest.' Since these concurring justices believe parties have no
improper access to candidates, they would go further and strike down the entire
party limit provision of the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act.29
The most striking opinion of Colorado Republican is the dissent by Justice
Thomas, an opinion joined only in parts by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnqiust. In a remarkably dynamic and aggressive opinion, he summons
Buckley before him and rejects the entire distinction between contributions and
expenditures.' While acknowledging that the validity of Buckley was not be-
fore the Court, Justice Thomas argued the weaknesses of that framework were
so appalling that he would strike down as unconstitutional all limits, of any
kind, either on contribution or expenditure amounts."'
On one hand, the reformers of political campaigns and elections should be
elated by Justice Thomas' opinion, since most people in the reform camp find
much fault in the Buckley distinction between contributions and expenditures.
On the other hand, Justice Thomas would hold all limitations unconstitution-
al-whether related to contributions or expenditures. Had Justice Thomas pre-
vailed and the Court reversed the First Amendment doctrine related to campaign
spending according to his theory, there would be no limits at all on political
23. See id. at 2315.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 2321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. See id. at 2322.
28. See id. at 2323.
29. See id.
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contributions-an area where even current First Amendment jurisprudence
allows regulation. One would, for example be able to contribute $100,000 to
whomever one wanted in a federal election, and the risk of corruption would
not be a justifiable reason to preclude such a contribution. Expenditure limits
would also remain unconstitutional. Thus, the First Amendment, according to
Justice Thomas, requires a world of unfettered political contributions and ex-
penditures limited only by bribery and disclosure laws, not by any additional
regime of campaign finance regulations.
The final opinion in Colorado Republican is a dissent written by Justice
Stevens and joined by Justice Ginsburg. Although this opinion does not devote
much time to criticizing Buckley, these justices would view reasonable restric-
tions on both contributions and expenditures as constitutional.32 In his dissent,
Justice Stevens writes, "[I] believe that the government has an important inter-
est in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost of federal
campaigns."'33 The logical consequence of the argument endorsed by Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg is that they would vote to overturn Buckley but, unlike
Justice Thomas, would hold as constitutional limits on both contributions and
expenditures.
In view of the several opinions and the holding in Colorado Republican,
Buckley comes out bruised but not unbowed. With regard to the potential for
electoral reform of campaign finance laws, one should expect that Congress will
not be able to get much further than stricter contribution limits, enhanced dis-
closure obligations, and restrictions on foreign contributions. Nonetheless, over-
all reform will be stymied by the holding in Colorado Republican. If one wants
to prohibit special interests from giving millions of dollars to political parties in
the next election cycle-as was done by special interest groups like the invest-
ment-securities industry, the trial lawyers, and the tobacco lobby in 1996-those
sorts of abuses will be very difficult to address under the Colorado Republican
framework, as it places severe constraints on reform in the name of the First
Amendment.
II. PROTECTING THE SPEECH RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
Of all the First Amendment cases decided last term, the government con-
tractor cases most closely fit into the traditional framework of First Amendment
jurisprudence. These cases provide added protection for those government con-
tractors who are threatened with economic punishment due to their political
views during the pendency of their contracts. The question raised by these cases
is: Can the state terminate a contractual relationship with government contrac-
tors as a result of their speech?
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In Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 4 the Court (as had the
County) faced the problem of an outspoken trash hauler who directed much of
his critical energies to the county for which he performed work. The trash haul-
er was constantly criticizing the county commissioners, and the commissioners
eventually decided that they had had enough of the trash hauler and terminated
his contract entirely. Similarly, in O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
Northlake, s a tow truck operator had been dropped from the rotation list for
towing cars for the city because he supported the Mayor's opponent in the
preceding election.
The Court was faced in these cases with the issue of whether or not to
extend the protection that public employees have historically enjoyed from
coercion based on speech to the independent contractor relationship. Although
Justice Holmes wrote that "a policeman may have a constitutional right to talk
politics but.., has no constitutional right to be a policeman," '36 that strict
resistance to the possibility that a constitutional right can be deprived through
economic coercion has largely been rejected. Under the theory known as the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the long standing position of the Supreme
Court is that a public employee's job may not be conditioned on a surrender of
his or her right to speak out as a citizen.3
The public contractor cases breathe added life into the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions and hold that the First Amendment protects independent
contractors from termination in retaliation for their exercise of free speech."
The Court employed traditional balancing analysis by weighing the free speech
interest against the state's interest and came to the conclusion that the balancing
result is the same whether the individual punished for speech is a public em-
ployee or a government contractor.' Although the result of the balancing test
is the same in either situation, the respective weights that are used are material-
ly different. On one hand, the independent contractor should not have the same
right to speak as a public employee because if the independent contractor loses
her contract, she can probably make it up somewhere else and get other work.
Therefore, the individualized speech interest is diminished for a government
contractor as compared to a public employee. However, the risk that the
individual's speech will be ascribed to the State is diminished if the speaker is a
government contractor. Thus, both the interests of the speaker and the State are
reduced in the government contractor context, leading the Court to treat their
situations equally for First Amendment purposes.
34. 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
35. 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996).
36. See Umbehr, 116 S. CL at 2347 (citing McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 55 Mass. 216, 220, 29
N.E. 517 (1892)).
37. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (government "may not deny a benefit...
on a basis that infringes constitutionally protected freedom of speech.").
38. See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2352; O'Hare, 116 S. CL at 2355.
39. See Umbehr, 116 S. CL at 2349; O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2357.
[Vol. 32:441
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The main drawback of the contractor cases is that they do not offer a
bright line rule and will spawn much litigation. Any person or company who
loses a government contract is immediately going to scream that they are being
punished for their exercise of free speech. This concern in its most heightened
form, however, is somewhat overblown since the cases do not apply to those
who bid for government work, but only to those independent contractors whose
preexisting government contracts are revoked.
A major point of interest in this line of cases is clearly the dissent by
Justice Scalia, joined only by Justice Thomas. Scalia is practically worked up
into a frenzy by the Court's holdings in Umbehr and O'Hare. While his logic is
largely sound and persuasive, his virulent tone and strident attacks are notewor-
thy. First, Justice Scalia argues that the United States has a long tradition of
political patronage, and a political figure should be able to fire those people
who do not support him." Second, Scalia argues that it might be good govern-
ment to have patronage. People are more loyal, and there are related efficiency
attributes to patronage.' Furthermore, there are other laws that protect against
patronage, such as government contracting bidding regulations and anti-bribery
laws.42 Finally, he notes that sometimes a person's political views should play
a role in determining the contracts into which the State will enter. For instance,
Justice Scalia asked whether a white racist group should be given a contract to
provide security services at a low-income housing unit. Scalia points out that
political views sometimes ought to matter with respect to government contracts,
and the courts should not pretend otherwise.43
In criticizing the majority, Justice Scalia does not limit his attack to his
differences about this particular opinion. He directs the attack to his fellow
justices on a personal level and on to a broader front. He writes, "One logical
proposition detached from history leads to another until the Court produced a
result that bears no resemblance to the America that we know."" Later in the
opinion, he writes, "The Court must be living in another world. Day by day,
case by case, it is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not recog-
nize."45 These statements shed light into the divided, volatile dynamic of this
Court, particularly when it comes to the First Amendment.
40. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr and O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S.
Ct. 2361, 2362 (1996) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
41. See id. at 2363.
42. See id. at 2364-66.
43. See id. at 2368.
44. Id. at 2366.
45. Id. at 2373.
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Ill. CONCLUSION
While the Court is divided in the manner in which it analyzed the various
First Amendment problems posed last term, it appears to be largely united by a
strong hostility against government regulation even when that reform would
arguably enhance public debate. In this Court's view, the State cannot be the
friend of speech; it is destined to serve as foe. Until the evidence can sway the
majority of the Court otherwise, this interpretation of the First Amendment will
frustrate the meaningful campaign finance reform the body politic seems to
need and want. Moreover, as the government contractor cases reveal, this Court
is not driven by consensus, and clarity in First Amendment doctrine will surely
prove ever more elusive.
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